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ANOTHER LOOK

AT

HARTFORD CIVIC CENTER COLISEUM COLLAPSE

By Rachel Martin1 and Norbert J. Delatte,2 Member, ASCE
ABSTRACT: Only a few hours after ﬁve thousand basketball fans had left, the roof of the Hartford Civic Center
Coliseum collapsed under a heavy snowfall. Fortunately, the arena was empty. The design of the space frame
roof had been based on an innovative and extensive computer analysis. However, when deﬂections twice as
great as those predicted by the computer analysis were observed during construction, the warning was ignored.
Overconﬁdence in computer analysis results played a large part in this failure. A useful lesson from this case is
that the computer is only an analytical tool and computed results must be checked by the designer with a careful
eye. The long, unbraced lengths of compression members made them highly susceptible to buckling. This case
serves as a lesson for engineering students and practicing engineers concerning the difﬁcult technical, professional, procedural, and ethical issues that may arise during the design and construction of a complex, highoccupancy structure.

INTRODUCTION
No one was killed or injured when the huge space truss roof
of the empty Hartford Civil Center Coliseum collapsed under
a heavy snowfall at 4:19 a.m. on January 18, 1978 (Fig. 1).
Had the failure occurred just a few hours before, however, the
death toll might have been hundreds, or even thousands. The
dramatic roof, designed with the aid of computers, had shown
evidence of distress during construction, but the warnings had
not been heeded. The building had been in service for ﬁve
years when it collapsed (Levy and Salvadori 1992).
For the engineer and engineering student, knowledge of engineering’s failures is just as important as knowledge of its
successes. A success illustrates what engineering can make
possible, while a failure demonstrates its limits. It takes numerous successful structures to ensure the quality of a design
or a construction method. One failure, however, can discredit
an entire design or building technique. Because of this, the
information that each failure has to offer should be carefully
studied and applied to all future designs. As a result, similar
failures, as well as their tragic consequences, can be avoided.
Because of their importance, failures should be incorporated
into engineering education. Unfortunately, undergraduate engineering students receive little exposure to engineering failures in college. This approach to engineering education not
only leaves students less prepared for what they will face after
college, but it also fails to show the importance of continuing
education (Delatte 1997). This may be one of the reasons that
a 1983 survey of ASCE section and branch presidents found
that engineering failures are all too common (Bosela 1993).
Since undergraduate engineering students already face an
overcrowded curriculum, rather than requiring a new class
covering failure case studies, these case studies can be incorporated into existing classes throughout a student’s college career. Not only will this approach capture the students’ interest
by showing how their classes relate to engineering, but it will
also inspire them to learn more about the history of the profession. In addition, it teaches them the importance of continued learning throughout their professional career. Finally, failure case studies provide a perfect opportunity to discuss ethical

concerns, another neglected topic in engineering education, in
real-life situations, as well as serving as a constant reminder
of the repercussions of careless engineering (Delatte 1997).
According to a 1987 survey conducted by the Education
Committee of the Technical Council on Forensic Engineering
of the American Society of Civil Engineers, 63.2% of schools
indicated that they would consider teaching a course on failure
case studies if the appropriate materials were available. This
clearly demonstrates the need for case study material and
teaching aids to encourage the incorporation of failure case
studies into the engineering curriculum (Rendon-Herrero
1993). The objectives of this paper are to:
1. Summarize what is known about the design, construction, and collapse of the Hartford Civil Center Coliseum.
2. Examine the causes of the failure as well as the legal
ramiﬁcations.
3. Explore the technical, procedural, and ethical concerns
present, focusing on how the failure could have been
avoided and how to prevent similar failures in the future.
This failure case study can be integrated into engineering
classes to introduce new topics or as the topic of a student
research paper assignment.
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
In 1970, Vincent Kling agreed to be the architect for the
Hartford Civic Center. Shortly thereafter he hired Fraoli,
Blum, and Yesselman, Engineers (FB&Y), to design the arena.
In order to save money, FB&Y proposed an innovative design
for the 91.4 X 110 m (300 X 360 ft) space frame roof 25.3

FIG. 1. Hartford Civic Center Coliseum Roof Collapse, 1978
(Construction Failure, Feld and Carper, © 1997. Reprinted by
Permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.)

m (83 ft) over the arena. The proposed roof consisted of two
main layers arranged in 9.14 X 9.14 m (30 by 30 ft) grids
composed of horizontal steel bars 6.4 m (21 ft) apart. Diagonal
members 9.14 m (30 ft) long connected the nodes of the upper
and lower layers and, in turn, were braced by an intermediate
layer of horizontal members. The 9.14 m (30 ft) members in
the top layer were also braced at their midpoint by intermediate diagonal members (Figs. 2 and 3).
This design departed from standard space frame roof design
procedures in ﬁve ways:
1. The cross-section conﬁguration of the four steel angles
making up each truss member did not provide good resistance to buckling. The cross-shaped built-up section
had a much smaller radius of gyration than either an
I-section or a tube section conﬁguration of the same
structural members (Fig. 4). As a result, the buckling
load for the cross-shaped section was much lower than
that of the other conﬁgurations.
2. The top horizontal members intersected at a different
point than the diagonal members rather than at the same
point, making the roof especially susceptible to buckling
because the diagonal members did not brace the top
members against buckling.
3. The top layer of this roof did not support the rooﬁng
panels; short posts on the nodes of the top layer did. Not
only were these posts meant to eliminate bending stresses
on the top layer bars, but their varied heights also allowed water to be carried away to drains.
4. Four pylon legs positioned 13.7 m (45 ft) inside the

FIG. 2. Elevation of Space Frame Roof (Circled Section Is
Shown Enlarged in Fig. 3)

edges of the roof supported it instead of boundary columns or walls (Levy and Salvadori 1992).
5. The space frame was not cambered. Computer analysis
predicted a downward deﬂection of 330 mm (13 in.) at
the midpoint of the roof and an upward deﬂection of 150
mm (6 in.) at the corners (‘‘Space’’ 1978).
Because of these money-saving innovations, the engineers employed state-of-the-art computer analysis to verify the safety
of the building.
A year later construction began. To save time and money,
the roof frame was completely assembled on the ground.
While it was still on the ground the inspection agency notiﬁed
the engineers that it had found excessive deﬂections at some
of the nodes. Nothing was done.
After the frame was completed, hydraulic jacks located on
top of the four pylons slowly lifted it into position. Once the
frame was in its ﬁnal position but before the roof deck was
installed, its deﬂection was measured and found to be twice
that predicted by computer analysis, and the engineers were
notiﬁed. They, however, expressed no concern and responded
that such discrepancies between the actual and the theoretical
should be expected (Levy and Salvadori 1992).
When the subcontractor began ﬁtting the steel frame supports for fascia panels on the outside of the truss, he ran into
great difﬁculties due to the excessive deﬂections of the frame.
Upon notiﬁcation of this problem, the project manager ‘‘directed the subcontractor to deal with the problem or be responsible for delays.’’ As a result, the subcontractor coped
some of the supports and refabricated others in order to make
the panels ﬁt, and construction continued (‘‘Design’’ 1978).
The roof was completed on January 16, 1973 (Feld and
Carper 1997). The next year, a citizen expressed concern to
the engineers regarding the large downward deﬂection he noticed in the arena roof, which he believed to be unsafe. The
engineers and the contractor once again assured the city that
everything was ﬁne (Levy and Salvadori 1992).
COLLAPSE
On January 18, 1978, the Hartford Arena experienced the
largest snowstorm of its ﬁve-year life. At 4:19 a.m., the center
of the arena’s roof plummeted 25.3 m (83 ft) to the ﬂoor of
the arena, throwing the corners into the air. Just hours earlier
the arena had been packed. Luckily, it was empty by the time
of the collapse (Ross 1984).
CAUSES OF FAILURE

FIG. 3. Section of Space Frame Roof (Figure Courtesy of LZA
Technology, from Lev Zetlin Associates, 1978, Reprinted by Permission)

FIG. 4.

Compression Member Conﬁgurations

Hartford appointed a three-member panel to manage the investigation of the collaspe. This panel in turn hired Lev Zetlin
Associates, Inc. (LZA), to ascertain the cause of the collapse
and to propose a demolition procedure (Ross 1984). LZA issued its report later that year (Lev Zetlin Associates 1978).
LZA discovered that the roof began failing as soon as it was
completed due to design deﬁciencies. A photograph taken during construction showed obvious bowing in two of the members in the top layer.
Three major design errors, coupled with underestimation of
the dead load by 20% [estimated frame weight = 0.862 Pa (18
psf); actual frame weight = 1.10 Pa (23 psf)], allowed the
weight of the accumulated snow to collapse the roof (‘‘Design’’ 1978). The load on the day of collapse was 3.16–3.50
Pa (66–73 psf), while the arena should have had a design
capacity of at least 6.70 Pa (140 psf) (‘‘Collapsed’’ 1978b).
The three design errors responsible for the collapse are listed
below:
• The top layer’s exterior compression members on the east
and the west faces were overloaded by 852%.

• The top layer’s exterior compression members on the
north and the south faces were overloaded by 213%.
• The top layer’s interior compression members in the eastwest direction were overloaded by 72%.
In addition to these errors in the original design, LZA discovered that no midpoint braces were provided for the members in the top layer. The exterior members were only braced
every 9.14 m (30 ft), rather than the 4.57 m (15 ft) intervals
speciﬁed, and the interior members were only partially and
insufﬁciently braced at their midpoints. The two members attached to the midpoint of the top chord were both in the same
plane as the long axis of the chord, so they only provided
bracing in one direction. The perpendicular direction was effectively unbraced for the full 9.14 m (30 ft) length. This signiﬁcantly reduced the load that the roof could safely carry. In
addition, certain perimeter top chord members with a post
landing at midpoint were subjected to bending stress from the
roof load applied through the post. Since the members were
not designed for bending, this led to a considerable overstress
(Lev Zetlin Associates 1978).
Fig. 5 and Table 1 compare some of original details to actual
designs used in the building, demonstrating the reduction in
strength that these changes caused. Connection A was typically
used on the east-west edges of the roof, while connection B
was used on the north-south edges. Most of the interior members used connection C, while a few used connection D. The
key difference between the original and the as-built details
may be seen in Fig. 5 and also by comparing the top and
bottom rows of the table. The diagonal members were attached
some distance below the horizontal members. Thus, the ﬂexibility of the connection reduced the effectiveness of the bracing by introducing a ‘‘spring brace’’ instead of the hard brace
that had been assumed.
The most overstressed members in the top layer buckled
under the added weight of the snow, causing the other members to buckle. This changed the forces acting on the lower
layer from tension to compression, causing them to buckle also
in a progressive failure. Two major folds formed initiating the
collapse (‘‘Design’’ 1978). These were not the only errors that
LZA discovered. Listed below are the other factors that contributed to, but probably were not solely responsible for, the
collapse:
• The slenderness ratio of the built-up members violated the
American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) code
provisions. The spacer plates separating the individual angles were placed too far apart in some of the four-angle
members, allowing individual angles to buckle.
• The members with bolt holes exceeding 85% of the total
area violated the AISC code requirements for section reduction of tension members (‘‘Collapsed’’ 1978b).
• There were misplaced diagonal members (Feld and Carper
1997).
Loomis and Loomis, Inc., also investigated the Hartford collapse. They agreed with LZA that gross design errors were
responsible for the progressive collapse of the roof, beginning
the day that it was completed. They, however, believed that
the torsional buckling of the compression members, rather than
the lateral buckling of top chords, initiated the collapse.
Using computer analysis, Loomis and Loomis found that
the top truss members and the compression diagonal members
near the four support pylons were approaching their torsional
buckling capacity the day before the collapse. An estimated
0.575–0.718 Pa (12–15 psf) of live load would cause the roof
to fail. The snow from the night before the collapse comprised
a live load of 0.670–0.910 Pa (14–19 psf). Because torsional

FIG. 5. Comparison of Actual and Assumed Bracing (Figure
Courtesy of LZA Technology, from Lev Zetlin Associates, 1978,
Reprinted by Permission): (a) Original Design Assumption; (b)
Actual Design Condition

buckling is uncommon, it is often an overlooked mode of failure (‘‘New’’ 1979).
Hannskarl Bandel, a structural consultant, completed an independent investigation of the collapse for the architect’s insurance company. He blamed the collapse on a faulty weld
connecting the scoreboard to the roof. This opinion conﬂicts
with the opinions of all the other investigators (‘‘Hartford’’
1979). The LZA report’s ﬁndings were also disputed by FB&Y
(‘‘Collapsed’’ 1978a).
LEGAL REPURCUSSIONS
Six years after the collapse, all of the parties reached an
out-of-court settlement. While this was beneﬁcial to the parties
involved, it did not provide the engineering profession with
the precedents that such a case could set (Feld and Carper
1997).
TECHNICAL ASPECTS
The engineers for the Hartford Arena depended on computer
analysis to assess the safety of their design. Computer programs, however, are only as good as their programmer and
may tend to offer engineers a false sense of security (Shepherd
and Frost 1995). The LZA report noted ‘‘the computer model
used by the structural engineer only included the top and bottom chords and the main diagonals. Roof loads were only
applied at top chord main panel points. If the computer model
had represented the intermediate diagonals and horizontals and
had included the roof loads at the midpoint, subpanel points
at the top chord, the instabilities and primary bending moments would have been detected by the designer’’ (Lev Zetlin
Associates 1978).
Instead of the cruciform shape of the rods, a tube or I-bar
conﬁguration would have been more stable and less suscepti-

TABLE 1.

Comparison of Original Design and Actual As-Built Connections

ble to bending and twisting. The cruciform shape has the advantage of making the members easier to connect. Also, if the
horizontal and diagonal members intersected at the same place,
the bracing would have increased the buckling capacity in
these members. The LZA report noted that ‘‘apparently, the
choice of the typical member as a cruciform, a section that is
weak in bending and torsion, was based on the design assumption that such bending and torsion would be negligible
in the space truss’’ (Lev Zetlin Associates 1978).
The LZA report further noted that ‘‘the investigation conﬁrms that space trusses and/or space frames are valid and safe
structural systems. Two-way space trusses have been employed successfully on many projects. In the case of the Hartford Coliseum, unfortunately, certain aspects of the design and
construction were not implemented correctly’’ (Lev Zetlin Associates 1978).
PROFESSIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The Hartford Arena contract was divided into ﬁve subcontracts coordinated by a construction manager. Not only did this
fragmentation allow mistakes to slip through the cracks, it also
left confusion over who was responsible for the project as a
whole. Even though the architect recommended that a qualiﬁed
structural engineer be hired to oversee the construction, the
construction manager refused, saying that it was a waste of
money and that he would inspect the project himself. After the
collapse he disclaimed all responsibility on the grounds that a
design error had caused the collapse. He asserted that he was

only responsible for ensuring that the design was constructed
correctly and not the performance of the project (p. 202, Feld
and Carper 1997).
It is important for responsibility for the integrity of the entire project to rest with one person. Feld and Carper (pp. 202–
204, 1997) offer an excellent discussion of the role that procedural deﬁciencies played in this collapse.
As a result of the construction manager’s refusal to hire a
structural engineer for the purpose of inspection, no one realized the structural implications of the bowing members. This
collapse illustrates the importance of having a structural engineer, especially the designer, perform the ﬁeld inspection.
The designer understands the structure that is being built and
would best be able to recognize the warning signs of poor
structural performance and rectify them before they grow to
catastrophic proportions. The LZA report noted ‘‘the inspection and/or quality control procedures utilized . . . were inadequate and poorly handled. The absence of a full-time registered structural engineer experienced with the design and
construction of long-span special structures was a serious mistake. The visually apparent distortion or bowing of exterior
top chord members should have been a red ﬂag to one of the
inspecting parties that there was something seriously wrong
with the Hartford Coliseum space truss structure’’ (Lev Zetlin
Associates, 1978).
Finally, the Hartford department of licenses and inspection
did not require the project peer review that it usually required
for projects of this magnitude. If a second opinion had been
obtained, the design deﬁciencies responsible for the arena’s

collapse probably would have been discovered (Lev Zetlin Associates 1978). Peer reviews are an essential safety measure
for high-occupancy buildings and structures experimenting
with new design techniques (Feld and Carper 1997). Today,
Connecticut is one of the few states that requires peer review
of certain buildings.
ETHICAL ASPECTS
The excessive deﬂections apparent during construction were
brought to the design engineer’s attention several times. The
engineer, conﬁdent in his design and the computer analysis
that conﬁrmed it, ignored these warnings and did not take the
time to recheck his work. The engineer should pay close attention to unexpected deformations and investigate their
causes. They often indicate structural deﬁciencies and should
be investigated and corrected immediately. Unexpected deformations provide a clear signal that the structural behavior is
different from that anticipated by the designer.
Kaminetzky (1991) quotes at length from a story in The
Philadelphia Inquirer from May 28, 1978, about this incident,
headlined ‘‘Why The Roof Came Tumbling Down.’’ The story
suggests that the ironworkers knew from observing the deformations during construction that the building was a death trap
and had vowed never to enter it once it was completed. It also
questions why the workers’ warnings were not listened to.
Also, this collapse raises the important question of whether
the factor of safety should be increased for buildings with a
high occupancy. Should the impact of a possible failure be
taken into account in determining the factor of safety (Kaminetzky 1991)?
EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS
Petroski discusses this case in terms of the need for engineers to be able to reason out whether or not computer results
make sense, through hand calculations and knowledge of
structural behavior and performance. ‘‘Because the computer
can make so many calculations so quickly, there is a tendency
now to use it to design structures in which every part is of
minimum weight and strength, thereby producing the most economical structure. This degree of optimization was not practical to expect when hand calculations were the norm, and
designers generally settled for an admittedly overdesigned and
thus a somewhat extravagant, if probably extra-safe, structure.
However, by making every part as light and as highly stressed
as possible, within applicable building code and factor of
safety requirements, there is little room for error—in the computer’s calculations, in the part manufacturers’ products, or in
the construction workers’ execution of the design. Thus, computer-optimized structures may be marginally or least-safe designs, as the Hartford Civil Center roof proved to be’’ (p. 199,
Petroski 1985). In the decade and a half since Petroski wrote
these words, despite tremendous advances in computing power
and software, there is no sign that computer programs will
soon be able to envision failure modes that the designer has
not foreseen, or check their own work.
Failure plays an important role in engineering practice.
Through failure analysis, engineers can learn to avoid similar
technical errors, allowing them to build stronger, safer structures. Since failure analysis plays such an integral role in a
good engineer’s professional career, it only makes sense that,
in college, engineering students should be taught about failures, as well as their importance to any engineer’s professional
life. In light of an already overcrowded undergraduate engineering curriculum, integrating failure case studies into already
existing engineering classes is the most logical solution.
This approach gives students a better idea of the obstacles
that will face them after college, in addition to demonstrating

how the theoretical ideas taught in their classes are actually
applied by engineers. The only real obstacle that lies in the
way of increased failure awareness at the undergraduate level
is the absence of adequate resources, such as well-developed
failure case studies and appropriate illustrations. This paper
provides professors and students with a failure case study that
can be integrated into undergraduate classes.
How can educators use these aspects of this case? In structural analysis courses, they can be used to address technical
topics such as safety during construction, load paths, stability
of incomplete structures during construction, and stability of
structural members. Students may be assigned to research the
literature in greater depth and support or criticize the available
theories. For engineering students, the legal ramiﬁcations of
the case may be of even greater interest. Three additional important points that may be made are the importance of ﬁxing
overall responsibility on a project before difﬁculties are encountered, the need for inspection during construction, and the
need to read the literature of the profession to keep up with
technical and procedural advances.
As a class example or homework problem, students may
compare the moment of inertia for the cruciform, I, and the
tube conﬁgurations of four angles, as shown in Fig. 3. Angle
legs ranged from 89 to 203 mm (3 1/2 to 8 in.) long and were
8 to 22 mm (5/16 to 7/8 in.) thick depending on loads, and
the angles were separated by spacers 19 to 22 mm (3/4 to
7/8 inch) (Lev Zetlin Associates 1978). For numerical examples, 127 X 127 X 8 mm angles (L 5 X 5 X 5/16) may be
used. The torsional stiffness of these conﬁgurations may also
be calculated and compared.
CONCLUSIONS
A useful lesson from this case is that computer software is
only an analytical tool and that computed results must be
checked by the designer with a careful eye. Users must understand the theoretical foundations of the programs and the
associated limitations. This case serves as a lesson for engineering students and practicing engineers concerning the difﬁcult technical, professional, procedural, and ethical issues that
may arise during the design and construction of a complex,
high-occupancy structure. There is no substitute for a thorough
knowledge of structural behavior, coupled with a healthy skepticism toward the completeness and accuracy of computer software solutions to unusual problems.
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